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We consider a tournament among four equally strong semifinalists. The players have to decide
how much stamina to use in the semifinals, provided that the rest is available in the final and
the third-place playoff. We investigate optimal strategies for allocating stamina to the successive
matches when players’ prizes (payoffs) are given according to the tournament results. From the
basic assumption that the probability to win a match follows a nondecreasing function of stamina
difference, we present symmetric Nash equilibria for general payoff structures. We find three different
phases of the Nash equilibria in the payoff space. First, when the champion wins a much bigger payoff
than the others, any pure strategy can constitute a Nash equilibrium as long as all four players adopt
it in common. Second, when the first two places are much more valuable than the other two, the only
Nash equilibrium is such that everyone uses a pure strategy investing all stamina in the semifinal.
Third, when the payoff for last place is much smaller than the others, a Nash equilibrium is formed
when every player adopts a mixed strategy of using all or none of its stamina in the semifinals. In
a limiting case that only last place pays the penalty, this mixed-strategy profile can be proved to
be a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, at least when the winning probability follows a Heaviside
step function. Moreover, by using this Heaviside step function, we study the tournament by using
evolutionary replicator dynamics to obtain analytic solutions, which reproduces the corresponding
Nash equilibria on the population level and gives information on dynamic aspects.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1938 FIFA World Cup in France, Adhemar
Pimenta, the coach of the Brazilian national team, was
facing a dilemma: Spearheaded by Leoˆnidas da Silva,
the Brazilians had defeated the Polish in extra time and
consecutively eliminated Czechoslovakia in a replay after
the “Battle of Bordeaux.” Pimenta was becoming wor-
ried about the fatigue accumulation of his team members.
The next opponent in the semifinal was Italy, the reign-
ing world champion at that time. Worse was that the
final with Hungary would not be easier. After chang-
ing the starting lineup eight times, the coach decided to
play the semifinal against Italy without Leoˆnidas. Then
Brazil lost to Italy.
One might say retrospectively that the coach was im-
prudent. However, it is not a trivial question what would
have been a better choice in that situation, especially for
the person directly involved. Let us look back at their
next encounter during the 1970 World Cup in Mexico.
This time, Italy advanced to the final after the “Game of
the Century” against Beckenbauer’s Germany. However,
the energy exhausted in the semifinal turned out to be
such a great loss that the Azzurri was utterly defeated
by the Brazilians in the final. So they had to watch help-
lessly as Brazil took permanent ownership of the Jules
Rimet Trophy.
This kind of dilemma is by no means rare in tourna-
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ment competitions. It might have originated from the un-
fairness of sports tournament compared to sports leagues,
which is traded off against the efficiency of tournament
competitions [1–4]. How to distribute stamina over a
series of matches takes up an important part of the play-
ers’ strategies. We also point out that the dilemma cap-
tures an aspect of our society as a series of competitions,
which is an essential part of our daily life from television
shows like Project Runway to presidential elections with
the two-round system. A sports tournament serves as
a striking metaphor here, as clearly seen from the fact
that people often talk about fair play, front-runners and
a knock-out punch in these activities as well. In order to
investigate this dilemma, we consider a simple model for
a two-round tournament among four players with equal
stamina. The players have to decide how much stamina
to use in the first round (i.e., semifinals) provided that
only the rest is available in the second round. The sec-
ond rounds take place between winners (losers) of the
first round for the championship (third place). We as-
sume that the outcome of a match is described by a well-
defined probability function. This function should con-
tain all the essential information of the sport under con-
sideration, such as the rules to decide the winner (for ad-
ditional discussions about the dynamics of competitions
see Refs. [5, 6].) It gives the probability for a player to de-
feat an opponent as a function of their invested stamina,
so it will be called the winning probability function [7].
The chance is 50:50 when two players spend the same
amount of stamina and it is reasonable that the winning
probability is a nondecreasing function of the stamina
difference. At the end of the tournament, each player
gets a prize (payoff) for the finishing place. We consider
2a general payoff structure under a plausible constraint
that the payoff never decreases as a player moves up in
rank.
Having defined the game by choosing the winning prob-
ability function together with the payoffs, we have to ask
ourselves what we mean by solving this game. In game
theory, the Nash equilibrium is the most well-known so-
lution concept: Once it is achieved, players cannot be
better off by changing their own strategy alone [8]. One
may also investigate the game from an evolutionary point
of view. The replicator dynamics is widely used to study
the evolution of an infinite population with pure strate-
gies [9–12]. In this study, we apply both methods to our
tournament model for a better understanding and com-
pare the results to check their consistency.
In terms of Nash equilibrium, we find three different
phases, which divide the payoff space into three regions.
(i) First, when the champion wins a much bigger pay-
off than the others, any pure strategy can constitute a
Nash equilibrium as long as all four players adopt it in
common. (ii) If the payoff for the second-place winner
is also valuable enough, one has no reason to fight in
the second round. Therefore, the only Nash equilibrium
is such that everyone spends all the stamina in the first
round, i.e, semifinals. (iii) Finally, if the payoff for last
place is much smaller than the others, a Nash equilibrium
emerges when everyone adopts a mixed strategy using all
or none of the stamina with proper weights.
The above three phases are also analytically tractable
from the viewpoint of evolutionary dynamics when the
winning probability function is the Heaviside step func-
tion of the stamina difference between two players. The
results of the replicator dynamics are as follows. For case
(i), the population evolves to a single species adopting a
common pure strategy. Which pure strategy to adopt in
the long run depends on the initial strategy distribution.
For case (ii), the population evolves to a single species
using all the stamina in the first round. For case (iii),
the population becomes a genetic polymorphism of two
species. One spends all the stamina in the first round,
while the other reserves it all for the second round. The
proportions of these species correspond to the weights of
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in case (iii). These
solutions are fully consistent with the analysis of Nash
equilibria.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we define our game of the two-round tournament in detail
by specifying its strategy space and payoff structure. In
Sec. III we focus on symmetric Nash equilibria of this
game. We begin with simple limiting payoff structures
and then proceed to a general payoff structure to find
Nash equilibria for the entire payoff space. This analysis
is followed in Sec. IV by the evolutionary dynamics of an
infinite population with pure strategies and a comparison
of the results with the Nash equilibria.
II. MODEL
Let us consider four equally strong semifinalists and
denote them by A, B, C, and D, respectively. In the
first round, player A meets B, while C meets D. The
second round takes place between winners (for the cham-
pionship) and between losers (for third place) of the first
round. The players’ payoffs are given according to the
tournament result. The numerical values of the payoffs
are denoted by s for the champion, u for the second-place
winner, v for the third-place winner, and w for last place,
where w ≤ v ≤ u ≤ s. Nash equilibria and replicator dy-
namics are invariant under translation and rescaling of
the payoffs by a positive factor, so we may set w = 0 and
s = 1 without loss of generality. Then the payoff param-
eter space reduces to the (u, v) plane with 0 ≤ v ≤ u ≤ 1.
Each player’s strategy determines how much stamina
will be spent in the first round provided that the rest
is available in the second round. We assume that all the
players have an equal amount of stamina at the beginning
and normalize it as 1. Then player i’s strategy, which
is generally a mixed one, is expressed by a normalized
distribution function φi(x) of the mixing weights over a
closed interval [0, 1], i.e.,
∫ 1
0
φi(x)dx = 1. If the player
adopts a pure strategy of investing xi in the first round,
for example, φi(x) = δ(x − xi). As a slight abuse of
notation, we will often abbreviate such a pure strategy
as xi.
Suppose that the players have formed a strategy pro-
file [13] (φA, φB, φC , φD). In order to calculate ex-
pected payoffs, we need the winning probability function
f(xi, xj). It tells us how likely player i is to defeat player
j when they use stamina xi and xj , respectively. We
furthermore assume that f is a nondecreasing function
of the stamina difference ∆xij ≡ xi − xj ∈ [−1, 1], i.e.,
f(xi, xj) ≡ f(xi − xj) = f(∆xij). This implies that
a player’s winning probability never decreases as that
player’s investment increases. We do not consider a draw
as a match outcome and require f(∆xij) + f(∆xji) = 1.
Then we have f(0) = 12 , i.e., two players spending the
same amount of stamina have an equal chance to win
the match. It is convenient to consider only the relative
difference from f(0) by defining h(∆x) ≡ f(∆x) − f(0),
which is an odd function, because h(∆x) + h(−∆x) = 0.
It is non-negative for ∆x ≥ 0 and has a maximum at
∆x = 1. The maximum is bounded by 12 from above,
because f(∆x) = h(∆x) + 12 ≤ 1.
To demonstrate how to calculate the expected payoffs,
let us assume that the players’ moves are xA, xB, xC , and
xD, respectively. For player A, the probability to win the
semifinal is defined as 12 + hAB, where hij ≡ h(xi − xj).
If player A has really made it, the remaining stamina for
the final must be 1 − xA. Then, who will be A’s next
opponent in the final? With probability 12 + hCD, it is
player C with remaining stamina 1 − xC . Player A will
defeat C with probability 12 + h[(1 − xA) − (1 − xC)] =
1
2 − hAC . Alternatively, the opponent can be player D
3with probability 12−hCD, and playerA will defeatD with
probability 12 − hAD. Therefore, we find the probability
of A to be the champion as(
1
2
+ hAB
)[(
1
2
+ hCD
)(
1
2
− hAC
)
+
(
1
2
− hCD
)(
1
2
− hAD
)]
. (1)
It is straightforward to find the probability to take second
or third place as well. Then player A’s expected payoff
piA for these particular moves xA, xB , xC , and xD is
expressed as
piA =
(
1
2
+ hAB
)[(
1
2
+ hCD
)(
1
2
− hAC
)
+
(
1
2
− hCD
)(
1
2
− hAD
)]
+u
(
1
2
+ hAB
)[(
1
2
+ hCD
)(
1
2
+ hAC
)
+
(
1
2
− hCD
)(
1
2
+ hAD
)]
+v
(
1
2
− hAB
)[(
1
2
− hCD
)(
1
2
− hAC
)
+
(
1
2
+ hCD
)(
1
2
− hAD
)]
. (2)
This should be averaged over the distribution functions
φA(xA), φB(xB), φC(xC), and φD(xD) to yield the even-
tual expected payoff for player A. The other players’
payoffs are readily obtained by permuting the indices.
Note that our model is similar to the war of attrition
(WA) in that each strategy is defined on a continuous
space, leading to an infinite-sized payoff matrix. In ad-
dition, the WA bears a strong similarity to the chicken
game, as ours does when it matters not to be the loser.
One might even think of the semifinalists’ dilemma as a
variant of this famous game, where each player’s remain-
ing resources after the bid become as much important as
the victory itself. Obviously, such a variation would just
reflect the existence of the second round in our case. In
addition, this modification will induce a player to give
up the first round more easily whenever the opponent
appears aggressive enough. Beyond a qualitative level,
however, it is hard to predict the behavior, like the ratio
between investing 0% and 100% in the first round, by
this analogy. At the same time, we point out a subtle
difference of our game in that it is essentially one’s own
bid in the first round that determines one’s remaining re-
sources, whereas it would rather be one’s first opponent’s
bid in the WA [9, 12, 14].
III. NASH EQUILIBRIA
Let us first consider a simple limiting case of the payoff
structure by setting u = v = 0. In other words, only
the champion who has won both rounds gets a prize,
so it can be regarded as a winner-take-all system. We
will show that there exists an infinite number of Nash
equilibria of pure strategies where the players coordinate
their strategies by choosing the same value. If someone
spends less in the first round than this coordination, that
player becomes more likely to lose the first match. If
someone spends more, on the other hand, that player is
risking the chance to win the second round.
We can argue this statement more rigorously by taking
player A’s viewpoint. If A uses a pure strategy xA while
the other three use a common pure strategy x∗, then
hCD = 0 and hAB = hAC = hAD = h(xA − x∗) ≡ h.
Equation (2) thus reduces to
piA(xA, x
∗, x∗, x∗) =
1
4
− h2 ≤ piA(x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗) = 1
4
.
(3)
Therefore, the pure-strategy profile S∗ ≡ (x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗)
is a Nash equilibrium for any x∗ ∈ [0 1] if u = v = 0.
A. Region I
Now let us check how robust the Nash equilibrium S∗ is
for a general payoff structure. Player A’s expected payoff
of Eq. (2) becomes piA(x
∗, x∗, x∗, x∗) = 14 (1 + u+ v) be-
cause the total prize should be equally distributed among
the four players. If player A uses xA while the other three
use a common strategy x∗, Eq. (2) is simplified to
piA(xA, x
∗, x∗, x∗) =
(
1
2
+ h
)(
1
2
− h
)
+u
(
1
2
+ h
)(
1
2
+ h
)
+v
(
1
2
− h
)(
1
2
− h
)
, (4)
where h ≡ h(xA − x∗). For the strategy profile S∗
to be a Nash equilibrium, ∆piA ≡ piA(x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗) −
piA(xA, x
∗, x∗, x∗) ≥ 0 for any xA ∈ [0, 1]. From Eq. (4)
we have
∆piA = h(v − u) + h2(1− u− v) (5)
= h[(1− h)v − (1 + h)u+ h]. (6)
First, consider the case of xA > x
∗, i.e., h ≥ 0. The
payoff difference ∆piA is non-negative only when
v ≥ 1 + h
1− hu−
h
1− h. (7)
We have assumed u ≥ v, so the inequality Eq. (7) auto-
matically implies that
u ≥ 1 + h
1− hu−
h
1− h, (8)
which is satisfied only when u ≤ 12 . If this is the case,
the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. (7) is a nonincreasing
4function of h because
∂
∂h
(
1 + h
1− hu−
h
1− h
)
=
2u− 1
(1− h)2 ≤ 0. (9)
Let h0 be the greatest lower bound of h(xA − x∗) for
xA > x
∗. If a certain payoff structure represented by
(u, v) satisfies Eq. (7) for h = h0, it is guaranteed by
Eq. (9) that Eq. (7) holds true for any h ≥ h0. In other
words, ∆piA remains non-negative for any xA > x
∗ as
long as
v ≥ 1 + h0
1− h0 u−
h0
1− h0 . (10)
If xA < x
∗, on the other hand, we have h ≤ 0. Rewriting
Eq. (5) as ∆piA = h
2
[
(1− u− v) + |h|−1(u− v)], we see
that it is always non-negative for v ≤ u ≤ 12 .
Therefore, a strategy profile S∗ = (x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗) is a
Nash equilibrium for any x∗ ∈ [0, 1] if the payoff structure
(u, v) satisfies the inequality Eq. (10). We call this area
region I in the (u, v) payoff space. This region is not
observable if h0 vanishes: For example, if ∆x can be
infinitesimally small and h(∆x) continuously approaches
zero as ∆x → 0, then S∗ remains as a Nash equilibrium
only for 0 ≤ v = u ≤ 12 unless x∗ = 1. On the other
hand, region I becomes the largest when h0 =
1
2 , i.e.,
when f(∆x) is the Heaviside step function as follows:
f(∆x) =


0 ∆x < 0
1
2 ∆x = 0
1 ∆x > 0.
(11)
In this case, the region is bounded by v ≥ 3u − 1 and
0 ≤ v ≤ u ≤ 12 .
B. Region II
If x∗ = 1, it is impossible to have xA > x
∗ and we only
need to consider h ≤ 0. Then, ∆piA expressed in Eq. (5)
is always non-negative for u ≤ 12 because both terms on
the RHS are non-negative due to v ≤ u. For u > 12 , it is
better to work with Eq. (6), which tells us that ∆piA is
non-negative if
v ≤ 1 + h
1− hu−
h
1− h. (12)
As shown in Eq. (9), if u > 12 , the RHS of Eq. (12)
only grows as h ≡ h(xA − 1) increases. Therefore, once
(u, v) satisfies Eq. (12) for the minimum of h(xA − 1),
the inequality holds true for any xA. Due to the fact
that h(∆x) is a nondecreasing function, the minimum of
h(xA − 1) should be h(−1) = −h(1) ≡ −h1. We thus
conclude that the strategy profile S1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) is the
only Nash equilibrium if
v ≤ 1− h1
1 + h1
u+
h1
1 + h1
. (13)
Region II is the set of (u, v) points at which S1 is a Nash
equilibrium but S∗ = (x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗) is not for x∗ < 1. If
h1 =
1
2 , for example, this region is bounded by v ≤ 13 (u+
1), v ≤ 3u−1, and 0 ≤ v ≤ u ≤ 1. We depict a graphical
representation of regions I and II in Fig. 1. Note from
Eqs. (10) and (13) that the boundaries meet at (u, v) =(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
for any h0 and h1 in general. It is very interesting
that the phase boundaries are determined only by both
the extreme values h0 and h1, and are independent of the
shape of the function h(∆x) for 0 < ∆x < 1.
0
1/2
1
0 1/2 1
v
u
I
II
III
(a) h0>0
0
1/2
1
0 1/2 1
v
u
II
III
(b) h0=0
FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic phase diagrams with a gen-
eral payoff structure, where u is the relative payoff of the
second-place winner and v is that of the third-place winner,
for (a) h0 > 0 and (b) h0 = 0. The region of interest u ≥ v
is divided into three regions, denoted by I, II, and III, re-
spectively. Region I is characterized by the strategy profile
S∗ = (x∗, x∗, x∗, x∗) for any pure strategy x∗ ∈ [0, 1] and
bounded by Eq. (10). However, as drawn in (b), it shrinks to
a line segment of 0 ≤ u = v ≤ 1
2
if min∆x>0 h(∆x) = 0. In
region II bounded by Eq. (13), S∗ is not a Nash equilibrium
unless x∗ = 1. If v is large enough, the players may have a
common mixed strategy as a Nash equilibrium in region III
(see the text for details).
5C. Region III
The remaining region is given by
v ≥ 1− h1
1 + h1
u+
h1
1 + h1
, (14)
which is referred to as region III. We assume h1 > 0 be-
cause h1 = 0 would mean that each player’s expected
payoff is trivially 14 (1 + u+ v) irrespective of one’s strat-
egy. Let us consider a simple limiting payoff structure
again by setting u = v = 1. This is disadvantageous
only for last place, so we may call it a loser-pay-all as
a rhyme for the winner-take-all system given above. If
only the one that has lost both matches gets nothing, the
immediate goal should be to win at least one match. The
important keyword here is concentration. It means that
it is advisable to concentrate either on the first round
or on the second round. For this reason, we look for a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the form
mp = pδ(x) + (1− p)δ(1− x) (15)
with p ∈ [0, 1] and indeed find a strategy profile Sm =
(mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) as a Nash equilibrium, where
p∗ =
1 + h1 −
√
1 + h21
2h1
. (16)
The proof is given in Appendix A. It is noteworthy that
when h1 =
1
2 , the mixing weights p
∗ and 1 − p∗ are ϕ−2
and ϕ−1 = 1 − ϕ−2, respectively, where ϕ = (1 +√5)/2
is the golden ratio. This means that Sm is a Nash equi-
librium if the weights of concentration between the first
and second rounds are in the golden ratio. The condition
that h1 =
1
2 is often reasonable because one cannot win
without making an effort, especially if the opponent is
doing the best.
We can repeat the same procedure for general pay-
offs in region III. The above result is generalized by the
finding that Sm = (mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) is a Nash equi-
librium, where
p∗(u, v) =
kh1 − l −
√
k2h21 + l
2 − 2k2 + 2k
2kh1
(17)
with k ≡ 1− u+ v and l ≡ 1− u− v. In Appendix B we
prove that
piA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) ≤ piA(mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗)
=
1
4
(1 + u+ v)(18)
for any x ∈ [0, 1] under the condition that h(∆x) > 0 for
∆x > 0. The equality holds at both x = 0 and x = 1. In
other words, when player A adopts a concentration strat-
egy in the form of Eq. (15), A’s payoff is predetermined
as (1 + u+ v)/4, independent of the choice of p. In that
sense, mp∗ can be considered as a partial equalizer strat-
egy [15, 16]. One can readily check that Eq. (17) reduces
to Eq. (16) as (u, v)→ (1, 1). It is also worth noting that
Eq. (17) vanishes, i.e., p∗ → 0, so Sm converges to S1 as
v approaches the boundary given in Eq. (14).
Interestingly, Sm can be shown to be the only sym-
metric Nash equilibrium for u = v = 1, when the win-
ning probability is taken as the Heaviside step function
[Eq. (11)]. Suppose that every player is using a mixed
strategy m(x) given by
m(x) = pδ(x) + qδ(1 − x) + g(x), (19)
where p and q are probabilities of using x = 0 and x = 1,
respectively, and g(x) is non-negative on (0, 1). The con-
servation of total probability requires that
∫ 1−
0+ g(x)dx =
1− p− q ≥ 0. Noting that player A’s initial payoff must
be 34 due to symmetry, we will check whether A can be
better off by adopting mp∗ . When A has adopted mp∗ ,
whereas the others are still using m(x), player A’s payoff
piA can readily be calculated, because it depends on p
and q but not on the shape of g(x), for mp∗ consisting of
x = 0 and 1 only. Straightforward calculation leads to
piA = 1− 8p− 8p
2 + 2p3 − (1 +√5)(q3 − 2q)
4(3 +
√
5)
, (20)
and we can show that this is always greater than 34 unless
m(x) = mp∗ . Therefore, any symmetric strategy profile
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium except for Sm.
It is also instructive to consider other strategy pro-
files without such symmetry. For example, let us choose
f(∆x) as
f(∆x) =
{
1− 12e−∆x/Γ for ∆x > 0,
1
2e
∆x/Γ otherwise,
(21)
where Γ is a parameter for controlling sensitivity to the
difference of the stamina [7]. This choice permits a strat-
egy profile S10 = (1, 0, 1, 0) (and other combinations ex-
changed between A and B, or C and D) to be a Nash
equilibrium at (u, v) = (1, 1), as shown in Appendix C.
It is another possible manifestation of concentration, the
keyword of region III, in addition to the mixed-strategy
profile Sm. This seems to be parallel to the following
asymmetric Nash equilibrium in the WA [9, 12, 14], i.e.,
one player bids zero while the other does any number
equal to or higher than the value of the resource in hand.
We observe a similar situation in the chicken game as well
because it has one symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
plus two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria where one
player plays dove and the other plays hawk. There seems
to be a class of games that permits both symmetric and
symmetry-breaking solutions.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
In this section we consider replicator dynamics for the
evolution of an infinite population with pure strategies.
6When f(∆x) is chosen as Eq. (21) with Γ→ 0, this evo-
lutionary framework provides an alternative derivation
or interpretation of the Nash equilibria considered in the
previous section. The condition that Γ → 0 can be un-
derstood as restricting our interest to a particular case
of h0 = h1 =
1
2 [see, e.g., Eq. (11)].
A. Winner-take-all
If u = v = 0, only the final victory matters and there
exists an infinite number of Nash equilibria where the
players coordinate their strategies. We will review this
result by introducing an evolutionary process governing
an infinite population in which each individual has a pure
strategy x. The distribution of x inside the population at
time t is denoted by the probability density P (x; t) and
assumed to be continuous at any finite t. We assume
that the population evolves in such a way that successful
strategies gradually increase their portions by replacing
inferior ones, as is mathematically formulated as follows:
∂
∂t
P (x; t) = [pi(x; t)− 〈pi〉]P (x; t), (22)
where pi(x; t) means the payoff gained by strategy x at
time t and 〈pi〉 ≡ ∫ pi(x)P (x)dx is the average payoff of
the population. For brevity, we will suppress the depen-
dence on t henceforth. The evolutionary process as in
Eq. (22) is called the replicator dynamics [10, 11]. Even
on a continuous strategy space, the replicator dynam-
ics is well defined with no modification [17]. The initial
population P (x; t = 0) is nonzero everywhere in the unit
interval [0, 1]. As mentioned above, we only consider a
situation where f(∆x) is sharp enough to be approxi-
mated as the Heaviside step function (11) for mathemat-
ical tractability.
When u = v = 0, the expected payoff for player A
by playing xA is equivalent to the average of Eq. (1)
over P (xB), P (xC), and P (xD), which we will denote by
piA(xA). It is convenient to define
c(x) ≡
∫ 1
0
dx′P (x′)f(x− x′) =
∫ x
0
dx′P (x′), (23)
and some algebra with integration by parts leads to
piA(xA) = 2
∫ 1
0
dxBP (xB)fAB
×
∫ 1
0
dxC
[
P (xC)fCA
∫ 1
0
dxDP (xD)fCD
]
= 2c(xA)
∫ 1
xA
dxP (x)c(x)
= c(xA)
[
1− c2(xA)
]
, (24)
where fij ≡ f(xi − xj). Note that P (x) = ∂∂xc(x) with
c(0) = 0 and c(1) = 1. One can also readily calculate the
population average as
〈piA〉 =
∫ 1
0
dxc(x)
[
1− c2(x)]P (x) = 1
4
(25)
by an integration by parts again. The fact that 〈piA〉 = 14
is a natural result of the symmetry among the four play-
ers, i.e., equal probability to win on average. Therefore,
the replicator dynamics reduces to
∂
∂t
P (x) =
[
c(x) − c3(x)− 1
4
]
P (x). (26)
Equivalently, we may rewrite it as
∂
∂x
(
∂c
∂t
)
=
∂
∂x
(
1
2
c2 − 1
4
c4 − 1
4
c
)
, (27)
which means that
∂c
∂t
=
1
2
c2 − 1
4
c4 − 1
4
c+ ξ(t), (28)
where ξ(t) is a function of t only. Because c(x = 0; t) =
0 and c(x = 1; t) = 1, ξ(t) simply turns out to be 0.
Therefore, we have
∂c
∂t
= −1
4
c(c− 1)(c2 + c− 1). (29)
The RHS vanishes at c1 = 0, c2 = ϕ
−1 = (
√
5 − 1)/2 ≈
0.618, and c3 = 1. Plotting Eq. (29) shows that ∂c/∂t
is negative between c1 and c2, and positive between c2
and c3 [see Fig. 2(a)]. In other words, c2 is an unstable
fixed point whereas the other two are stable. Therefore,
if we consider x = x˜ such that c(x˜) = ϕ−1, the function
c(x) converges to zero when x < x˜, whereas it converges
to one when x > x˜, which means that a sharp peak in
P (x) develops at x˜ as t increases. Note that it is the cu-
mulative probability that determines x˜, so the peak po-
sition x˜ depends on the choice of the initial distribution
P (x; t = 0). In addition, Eq. (29) provides an explicit
example of mapping the replicator dynamics onto a re-
action system, parametrized in terms of c(x) [18, 19]. To
sum up, the replicator dynamics selects a single point x˜
characterized by c(x˜) = ϕ−1 as a refined solution among
infinitely many possibilities.
B. Loser-pay-all
It is also straightforward to recast the case of u = v =
1 into the evolutionary framework. Let LA be player
A’s probability to be last; we denote its average over
P (xB), P (xC), and P (xD) as LA. The gained payoff of
A corresponds to the probability not to be last; it can
be written as piA = 1 − LA. One can readily check that
LA = (1 − c)(2c − c2) and the corresponding replicator
dynamics is given as
∂
∂t
P (x) = − [LA(x) − 〈LA〉]P (x). (30)
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Replicator dynamics for (a) u = v =
0 and (b) u = v = 1. (a) Among the three fixed points
where ∂c
∂t
= 0, the middle one (the open circle) at c = ϕ−1 is
unstable, whereas the other two (the closed circles) are stable.
In the middle row, c is shown as a function of x (the thick red
line) for a uniform strategy distribution (the thin blue line).
It decreases to zero for x < ϕ−1, while it increases to one for
x > ϕ−1, resulting in a step function jumping at x = ϕ−1 as
shown in the bottom row. Hence, P (x) has a sharp peak at
x = ϕ−1 in the steady state. (b) The only stable fixed point
is at c = ϕ−2. The cumulative probability c decreases if it
is larger than ϕ−2 and increases when it is smaller than ϕ−2
resulting in the c(x) configuration in the bottom row: It is
zero at x = 0, one at x = 1 and c = ϕ−2 elsewhere, regardless
of the initial configuration. Hence, in the steady state, P (x)
has two peaks, one at x = 0 and the other at x = 1.
The symmetry implies
〈
LA
〉
= 14 again, so Eq. (30) re-
duces to the following:
∂c
∂t
= −1
4
c(c− 1)(c2 − 3c+ 1). (31)
The RHS vanishes at c = 0, 1, or ϕ−2 = 1 − ϕ−1 =
(3 − √5)/2 ≈ 0.382, werein only c = ϕ−2 is the stable
fixed point [see Fig. 2(b)]. This shows that the replicator
dynamics reproduces the common mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium at u = v = 1 on the population level.
C. General payoff systems
For general u and v, the same averaging process as
above yields the following equation:
∂c
∂t
=
1
4
c(c− 1)Ω(c;u, v), (32)
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Fraction of population choosing a pure
strategy x at time t, obtained by numerical integration of
the replicator equation with spatial and temporal step sizes
dx = 10−3 and dt = 10−2. The initial distribution is assumed
uniform so that each x has probability P (x; t = 0)dx = 10−3.
(a) The distribution converges toward x = ϕ−1 (the dotted
vertical line) in the winner-take-all case (u = v = 0), while (b)
Two peaks emerge at x = 0 with weight ϕ−2 and x = 1 with
weight ϕ−1 in the loser-pay-all case (u = v = 1). Although
the simulation is a discretized version of the replicator equa-
tion due to the nature of numerical simulation, the results
nicely confirm the analytic solutions for continuous strategy
space.
where Ω(c;u, v) ≡ (u − v − 1)c2 + (u + 3v − 1)c + (u −
3v + 1). The main questions are the location of c∗ such
that Ω(c∗;u, v) = 0 and its stability. From 1−u+ v 6= 0,
it is straightforward to find
c∗±(u, v) =
−(1− u− 3v)±
√
D(u, v)
2(1− u+ v) , (33)
with D(u, v) ≡ (1−u−3v)2+4(1−u+v)(u−3v+1). Note
that c∗+ → ϕ−1 as (u, v) → (0, 0), whereas c∗− → ϕ−2 as
(u, v) → (1, 1). It is worth mentioning that c∗+ = 1 if
v = 3u − 1, while c∗− = 0 if u = 3v − 1, because these
two lines determine the shape of the phase diagram as
depicted in Fig. 1(a). It is interesting that the phase
diagram suggests duality under reflection across u+ v =
1, and the replicator equation is actually covariant under
the transformation (u, v, c, t)→ (1− v, 1− u, 1− c,−t).
If v > 3u−1, which corresponds to region I in Fig. 1(a),
only c∗+(u, v) in Eq. (33) lies inside the unit interval [0, 1]
as an unstable fixed point. On the other hand, in region
III where v > 13 (u + 1), only c
∗
−(u, v) is found inside the
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a) Cumulative c and (b) the cor-
responding fraction P as a function of x at three different
values of t (with u = v = 0), provided that we start from
an initial distribution P (x; t = 0) = e−4x/Z with a normal-
ization constant Z ≡ (1 − e−4)/4. The curves are obtained
by numerical integration of replicator dynamics in the same
way as explained in Fig. 3. The vertical dotted lines represent
x = x˜ ≈ 0.233, and the horizontal one does c = ϕ−1 (see the
text).
interval and it is stable. In the rest of the possible region
of u ≥ v, neither of c∗± is feasible, and c = 0 appears as
a stable fixed point. This implies that P (x) evolves to
δ(1−x) in the long run if the second-place prize is worth
enough, which means that all players do their best in the
semifinal to advance to the final in region II.
Furthermore, let us check the population average of
the strategies in the long-time limit, written as 〈x〉 =∫
dx [xP (x; t→∞)]. It is simply 1 over region II, where
the distribution is driven to a δ peak at x = 1. In
region III, the average is found to be 1 − c∗−, which is
larger than or equal to ϕ−1, where the equality holds at
(u, v) = (1, 1). In region I, 〈x〉 is dependent on the initial
condition in general. However, if we start from a uniform
distribution P (x, t = 0) = 1, we see that 〈x〉 = c∗+, which
is again greater than or equal to ϕ−1, and the equality
holds at (u, v) = (0, 0).
D. Numerical calculation
To provide an intuitive example, we perform a nu-
merical simulation of the replicator dynamics for two
representative cases: the winner-take-all (u = v = 0)
and loser-pay-all (u = v = 1) cases with f(∆x) given
by Eq. (11). Figure 3 shows the fraction inside the
population choosing a pure strategy x at time t. We
assume the initial distribution to be uniform such as
P (x; t = 0)dx = 10−3 because we assume a finite res-
olution dx = 10−3 for the simulation. The population
converges to x = ϕ−1 in the winner-take-all case. On the
other hand, the loser-pay-all case shows two peaks, one
at x = 0 and the other at x = 1.
Another important piece of information is how quickly
the Nash equilibrium is approached in this dynamics. To
answer this question, let us linearize Eq. (29) at each
fixed point as follows:
∂c
∂t
≈


−(c− c1)/τs at c1 = 0
+(c− c2)/τu at c2 = (
√
5− 1)/2
−(c− c3)/τs at c3 = 1,
(34)
where τs = 4 is a time scale to approach one of the stable
fixed points c1 and c3, and τu = 4/(5− 2
√
5) ≈ 7.578 is
another time scale to get away from the unstable fixed
point c2. The stable fixed points lie at a distance of
O(e−1) from c2, so the overall time scale for convergence
can be estimated as τ ∼ τs + τu ∼ O(10), which is con-
sistent with Fig. 3. This argument gives the same τ for
the loser-pay-all case when it applies to Eq. (31).
Suppose that we instead take a nonuniform distribu-
tion P (x; t = 0) = e−4x/Z with a normalization con-
stant Z ≡ (1 − e−4)/4 as the initial condition. Based
on the discussion in the last paragraph of Sec. IVA,
we find that the cumulative fraction c equals ϕ−1 at
x˜ = ln{2e4/[(3 − √5)e4 + √5 − 1)]}/4 ≈ 0.233. This
point remains invariant as an unstable fixed point when
t increases, whereas c = 0 and c = 1 are stable [Fig. 4(a)].
As a consequence, P (x) develops a peak at x˜ as shown
in Fig. 4(b). One can readily generalize this result to an
arbitrary initial distribution whose support is the unit
interval [0, 1].
We may also consider a finite population consisting of
N individuals evolving with the Moran process (see, e.g.,
Ref. 20 for a review). In this process, we choose an in-
dividual for reproduction with probability proportional
to the payoff, which is readily calculated from the distri-
bution of strategies. We then randomly choose an indi-
vidual for death with equal probability, regardless of the
payoff, and it can be the same individual that we have
chosen for reproduction. The former individual makes
a copy to replace the latter individual chosen for death
and such an update is repeated N times during a sin-
gle time step to give an equal chance to everyone. For
computational convenience, we assume that a strategy
has finite resolution dx = 10−3. Figure 5 shows typical
results when initial strategies are sampled from a uni-
form random distribution. When the population size is
large enough, we observe convergence with a time scale of
t ∼ O(10) time steps for both the winner-take-all and the
loser-pay-all cases. The behavior of a small population
is more complicated by the discreteness and deserves a
systematic investigation in a future study.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Cumulative distribution resulting
from the Moran process for a finite population of N indi-
viduals. We consider N = 102 and 104, and assume finite
resolution of dx = 10−3 in defining strategy x. Each curve
represents a single run with an initial condition sampled from
a uniform random distribution of x. (a) In the winner-take-
all case (u = v = 0 and t = 10), the cumulative distribution
develops a jump near x ≈ 0.6 for N = 104, implying a sin-
gle peak in the strategy distribution around x ≈ 0.6, after
O(10) time steps. (b) For u = v = 1, N = 104, and t = 20,
the behavior is again consistent with the result of replicator
dynamics in that we find a plateau of height ≈ 0.4, when
t ∼ O(10) time steps.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We have proposed a simple example of distributing a
finite amount of resources in competitions. Despite the
complexity of the decision problem among four players,
we have found two important keywords, i.e., balance and
concentration, which can serve as a practical guide to
strategic thinking. There are two representative cases
for these keywords, i.e., u = v = 0 and u = v = 1. The
former, in particular, has infinitely many Nash equilib-
ria, which are characterized by any common strategy for
all the semifinalists. The coordination would be achiev-
able in the presence of cheap talk, as in the case of a
usual coordination game [21]. In the latter, the situa-
tion is similar to the chicken game, because it is better
to give in if your opponent really goes for broke to win
the semifinal, as illustrated by S10. The mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium is such that you stake all at the semifi-
nals with probability ϕ−1 ≈ 0.618 and give up the game
with ϕ−2 = 1 − ϕ−1 ≈ 0.382. The emergence of the
golden ratio is fascinating, because it is the most impor-
tant ratio of division in mathematics, also known as the
most irrational number due to its slowest convergence in
the continued fraction [22]. We have also shown that the
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is the only symmetric
solution when we use the Heaviside step function to de-
termine the probability of winning.
We have also investigated the problem from an evolu-
tionary point of view by introducing the replicator dy-
namics. As mentioned above, a number of different Nash
equilibria exist for some payoff structures. The replica-
tor dynamics selects one of them depending on the ini-
tial population distribution. Those Nash equilibria can
be accessed via a certain learning process, i.e., updating
the strategy based on its performance. For the winner-
take-all case, the replicator dynamics converges to a pure
strategy characterized by the golden ratio again, i.e., at
position x˜ where the cumulative probability is equal to
ϕ−1. On the other hand, for the loser-pay-all case, two
peaks emerge, one at x = 0 with weight ϕ−2 and the
other at x = 1 with weight ϕ−1. The replicator dynamics
result not only provides an alternative derivation for the
Nash equilibria on the population level, but also sheds
light on the duality behind the (u, v) phase diagram in
the limit of small Γ.
If we take the Sochi 2014 Olympics as an example
of (u, v), the relative price of the raw material to pro-
duce a silver medal compared with that of a gold medal
roughly corresponds to u ≈ 0.6 and that of a bronze
medal amounts to v < 1%. This parameter set belongs
to region II, where everyone cares only about the semifi-
nals in the long term. However, this only proves that the
raw material price is a poor measure of assessing the true
values of the medals, because the finals in the Olympics
have remained thrilling throughout the century.
From a little different viewpoint, our work suggests
how to design an incentive system to affect the behav-
ior of individuals under structured competition: We can
imagine members of an organization who compete to win
a position in the hierarchy with a limited amount of re-
sources. If only the top position is rewarded in effect, for
example, it will signal to the members that the organi-
zation favors generalists rather than specialists, making
them conservative in investing effort into specific tasks.
They will even experience a social dilemma when the
induced behavioral characteristics contradict the organi-
zation’s goals. As mentioned above, our life is shaped to
a great extent by a series of competitions in an organized
society. In this respect, our tournament model will serve
as a starting point to investigate the effects of structured
competition on our behavior in various contexts.
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Appendix A: Nash equilibrium for u = v = 1
We will prove that a strategy profile Sm =
(mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) is a Nash equilibrium for u = v = 1,
wheremp = pδ(x)+(1−p)δ(1−x) and p∗ = 1+h1−
√
1+h2
1
2h1
with h1 ≡ h(1) > 0.
Suppose that player A spends x in the semifinal, while
the others have a certain mixed strategy mp. We define
LA(x,mp,mp,mp) as the probability that A becomes last
in the tournament in this situation. It is a product of two
probabilities L1 and L2: The former is the probability to
lose the semifinal with expending x. The latter is a con-
ditional probability to lose the third-place playoff given
that A has already lost the first match with expending
x.
Let us begin with the semifinal between A and B.
Player B spends all or nothing with probability 1 − p
and p, so B’s probability to defeat A is given as
L1 = pf(−x) + (1− p)f(1− x). (A1)
For the third-place playoff, player A has remaining
stamina 1−x. To calculate L2, however, we need to know
A’s opponent’s characteristics, resulting from the other
semifinal between C and D. For the semifinal between
C and D, there are three possibilities in their strate-
gic choices: (i) With probability p2, both use the strat-
egy of x = 0; (ii) with probability (1 − p)2, both use
x = 1; (iii) with probability 2p(1 − p), one uses x = 0
and the other uses x = 1. For the case (iii), the prob-
ability that the one with x = 1 to lose the semifinal is
f(−1). Therefore, the probability that the loser of the
semifinal between C and D has used up its total stamina
is (1 − p)2 + 2p(1− p)f(−1) ≡ q. In other words, this is
the probability for player A to meet an opponent with no
remaining stamina. The idea is that player A effectively
experiences its opponent’s strategy as mq. That is,
L2 = qf(x− 1) + (1 − q)f(x), (A2)
whereby we obtain LA(x,mp,mp,mp). Some algebra
shows that LA(0,mp,mp,mp) = LA(1, ,mp,mp,mp) =
1
4
when p = p∗. For 0 < x < 1, we plug the explicit expres-
sion of p∗ into LA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) and find that
4h21LA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) = [h1 + (a+ b)G− (a− b)h1]
× [h1 + (a+ b)G+ (a− b)h1], (A3)
where G ≡
√
1 + h21 − 1, a ≡ h(1 − x), and b ≡ h(x).
Noting that G2 = h21 − 2G, we expand the RHS as
[h1 + (a+ b)G]
2 − [(a− b)h1]2 (A4)
= h21 + 2(a+ b)h1G+ (a+ b)
2G2 − (a− b)2h21 (A5)
= h21 + 4abh
2
1 + 2(a+ b)(h1 − a− b)G. (A6)
This expression is invariant under the exchange between
a and b, which allows us to assume that a ≥ b without
loss of generality. As h1 ≥ a = h(1 − x), putting a in
place of h1 results in the following inequality:
4h21LA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) ≥ h21 + 4abh21 − 2(a+ b)bG.
(A7)
We now replace b by a in the last set of parentheses to
get
4h21LA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) ≥ h21 + 4abh21 − 4abG
= h21 + 4ab(h
2
1 −G). (A8)
Finally, we use the fact that h21−G = 1+h21−
√
1 + h21 > 0
to derive
4h21LA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) > h
2
1, (A9)
which implies LA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) >
1
4 .
Due to the symmetry among the players, it is ob-
vious that LA(mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) =
1
4 . Because
LA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) > LA(mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) for any
x ∈ (0, 1), player A has no reason to choose such x.
This argument tells us that A’s best choice must be a
certain mixed strategy mp = pδ(x) + (1 − p)δ(1 − x).
However, we have already seen that this links A’s pay-
off to 14 irrespective of p, because LA(0,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) =
LA(1,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) =
1
4 . For this reason, player A may
adoptmp∗ as well and we conclude that the strategy pro-
file Sm = (mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
Appendix B: Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for
general u and v
We will extend the above conclusion to the interior of
region III by proving that Sm with p
∗(u, v) in Eq. (17)
is a Nash equilibrium. It is convenient to define k ≡
1− u+ v, l ≡ 1− u− v, and z ≡
√
k2h21 + l
2 − 2k2 + 2k.
As above, we also have h1 ≡ h(1) which is assumed to
be 0 < h1 ≤ 12 . The interior of region III is described by
k + l > 0 and 1 + lh1 < k < 1 [compare with Eq. (14)].
Note also that k is strictly positive. In terms of these
variables, Eq. (17) can be rewritten as
p∗(u, v) =
1
2
− l + z
2kh1
. (B1)
The outline of the proof is similar to the above one
for u = v = 1: Suppose that player A spends x at the
semifinal, while all the others use mp. The probability
for A to defeat B is
W1 = pf(x) + (1− p)f(x− 1). (B2)
Regarding the final, we first consider strategies in the
semifinal between C and D and calculate the probabil-
ity r that A’s opponent in the final has no remaining
stamina. It is given as
r = 2p(1− p)f(1) + (1− p)2. (B3)
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Therefore, the probability for A to win the final is thus
W2 = rf(1 − x) + (1− r)f(−x). (B4)
It is straightforward to write down A’s payoff as
piA(x,mp,mp,mp) = W1W2+uW1(1−W2)+vL1(1−L2),
(B5)
where L1 and L2 are as defined above. Due to symmetry,
we see that
piA(mp,mp,mp,mp) =
1
4
(1 + u+ v) =
1
4
(2− l). (B6)
If we require piA(0,mp,mp,mp) = piA(1,mp,mp,mp) =
1
4 (1 + u+ v), it is satisfied only at p
∗(u, v).
Now we have to show that
piA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) <
1
4
(1 + u+ v) (B7)
for x ∈ (0, 1), from which it follows that mp∗ constitutes
a Nash equilibrium. We obtain an explicit expression
of the left-hand side by inserting p∗(u, v) into Eq. (B5),
which is written as
piA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) = (4a
2h21)
−1
{
(2− b)a2h21
+ 2ω1h(1− x)[h(1 − x)− h1] (B8)
+ 2ω2h(x)[h(x) − h1] (B9)
+4ω3h(x)h(1 − x)} , (B10)
where
ω1 ≡ l2(l + z) + (2l+ z)k(1− k) + k2(1− k)h1
ω2 ≡ l2(l + z) + (2l+ z)k(1− k)− k2(1− k)h1
ω3 ≡ l2(l + z) + (2l+ z)k(1− k) + k2lh21. (B11)
In region III, ω1 and ω2 are positive, whereas ω3 is neg-
ative. Using h1 ≥ h(1 − x), we replace h(1 − x) in the
first set of square brackets of Eq. (B8) by h1. Likewise,
because h1 ≥ h(x), we do the same with h(x) in the sec-
ond set of square brackets in Eq. (B9). The result is the
following inequality:
piA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) ≤ (B12)
(4k2h21)
−1[(2 − l)k2h21 + 4ω3h(x)h(1− x)].
Clearly, the last term in the square brackets of Eq. (B13)
is negative as long as h(x) > 0 for x > 0, which leads us
to the conclusion that
piA(x,mp∗ ,mp∗ ,mp∗) ≤ (4k2h21)−1(2− l)k2h21
=
1
4
(2− l).
Appendix C: Strategy profile S10 = (1, 0, 1, 0) at
(u, v) = (1, 1)
Let us choose the following sigmoid function:
f(∆x) =
{
1− 12e−∆x/Γ for ∆x > 0,
1
2e
∆x/Γ otherwise,
(C1)
where Γ is a positive parameter to control the width. It
will be shown that S10 = (1, 0, 1, 0) a Nash equilibrium
with this specific choice. Of course, other combinations
exchanging players A and B, or C and D, are equivalent.
To prove that S10 is a Nash equilibrium, we consider
the following two strategic configurations from player A’s
point of view.
First, suppose that the opponent player B has thrown
in the towel, i.e., the profile is given as (x, 0, 1, 0). We
have to find the value of x that minimizes the prob-
ability LA(x) for player A to be last. For LA(x) =
[1 − f(x)][f(−1)f(x − 1) + f(1)f(x)], its derivative is
readily written in terms of f(x) and dfdx . Note that the
function f(x) has the following property under differen-
tiation:
df(x)
dx
≡ f ′(x) =
{
1
2Γe
−x/Γ = 1−f(x)Γ for x > 0,
1
2Γe
x/Γ = f(x)Γ otherwise.
(C2)
Using this property, we find that
dLA
dx
= Γ−1[1− f(x)]f(1)[1− 2f(x)]. (C3)
The above expression cannot be positive because 12 ≤
f(x) < 1, which implies that player A is motivated to
have xA = 1 to minimize LA. This choice is reasonable
because A must win this match with strong possibility at
any cost.
Second, as an opposite situation, suppose that playerB
stakes all on a single throw, i.e., where the profile is given
as (x, 1, 1, 0). If every other player is concentrating all the
efforts on either this round or the next one, player A has
no reason to play by halves because such a strategy would
always put A in a weaker position than the opponent.
This statement is mathematically expressed by d
2LA
dx2 ≤ 0,
where LA(x) = [1− f(x− 1)][f(−1)f(x− 1) + f(1)f(x)]
is the probability for player A to be last. The inequality
implies that even if the first derivative dLAdx vanishes, it
will be a maximum of LA, so the minima should be found
at the boundary points, i.e., either at x = 0 or at x =
1. Direct calculation shows that LA(x = 0) − LA(x =
1) = 14 [f(1) − 1][2f(1) − 1]2 < 0 for any possible f(1)
between 12 and 1. In short, the minimum of LA appears
at x = 0. This means that player A should prepare for
the next match avoiding all-out war this time to reduce
the probability to be last.
[1] E. Ben-Naim and N. W. Hengartner, Phys. Rev. E 76,
026106 (2007).
[2] E. Ben-Naim, S. Redner, and F. Vazquez, Europhysics
12
Letters 77, 30005 (2007).
[3] E. Ben-Naim, F. Vazquez, and S. Redner, J. Korean
Phys. Soc. 50, 124 (2007).
[4] E. Ben-Naim, N. W. Hengartner, S. Redner, and
F. Vazquez, Journal of Statistical Physics 151, 458
(2013).
[5] E. Ben-Naim, B. Kahng, and J. S. Kim, Journal of
Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment 2006,
P07001 (2006).
[6] E. Ben-Naim, F. Vazquez, and S. Redner, J. Quant.
Anal. Sports 2, 1 (2006).
[7] S. K. Baek, I. G. Yi, H. J. Park, and B. J. Kim, Sci.
Rep. 3, 3198 (2013).
[8] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1991).
[9] J. Maynard Smith, Journal of Theoretical Biology 47,
209 (1974).
[10] P. D. Taylor and L. B. Jonker, Mathematical Biosciences
40, 145 (1978).
[11] J. Hofbauer, P. Schuster, and K. Sigmund, Journal of
Theoretical Biology 81, 609 (1979).
[12] J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982).
[13] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Physics Reports 446, 97 (2007).
[14] D. T. Bishop and C. Cannings, Journal of Theoretical
Biology 70, 85 (1978).
[15] W. H. Press and F. J. Dyson, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 109, 10409 (2012).
[16] C. Hilbe, M. A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund, Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 110, 6913 (2013).
[17] J. Oechssler and F. Riedel, Economic Theory 17, 141
(2001).
[18] S. K. Baek, X. Durang, and M. Kim, PLoS ONE 8,
e68583 (2013).
[19] M. J. Lee, S. D. Yi, B. J. Kim, and S. K. Baek, Phys.
Rev. E 91, 012815 (2015).
[20] H.-C. Jeong, S.-Y. Oh, B. Allen, and M. A. Nowak, J.
Theor. Biol. 356, 98 (2014).
[21] J. Farrell and M. Rabin, J. Econ. Perspect. 10, 103
(1996).
[22] W. B. Jones andW. J. Thron, Continued Fractions: Ana-
lytic Theory and Applications (Addison-Wesley, Reading,
MA, 1980).
